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ABSTRACT
While European governments have pursued illegalized migrants for decades, the techniques
through which they do so have taken a more radical turn since 2015. Focusing on the particular
case of Belgium, this paper documents how its Federal government has increasingly tried to “po-
lice” migrants into the European refugee regime, while migrants and citizens have continued to
resist these efforts through a series of “political” actions. Drawing on ethnographic work with the
Brussels-based Citizen Platform for the Support of Refugees, I pursue two aims: first, I demon-
strate how the Belgian state has consciously produced a humanitarian crisis as part of a broader
“politics of exhaustion”; and second, I explore the specific forms and types of humanitarian
action that emerge from citizens’ response to these policies. I do so by describing three moments
in which these opposing logics of policing and politicization conjure.
INTRODUCTION
It is an early morning in April 2018 when I walk around the Parc Maximilien in Brussels. I find
myself in the company of two women I have just met, one appears to be a retired teacher, and the
other, a dedicated housewife. Together with a dozen of other groups of two or three people, we are
patrolling the area to warn small groups of men that in a few minutes the police will be coming,
and it might be safer to leave the park and the Brussels-North train station for a few hours. Most
men nod and move, mumbling “merci”, “chokran” or “thank you”. Others need to be woken up,
from their sleeping bags, tents or cardboard blankets. Suddenly, a police van stops besides a small
hill in the corner of the park. One of the officers stretches her arm through the window, pointing to
a man standing in front of his tent on the slope of the hill. A few minutes earlier, we had told the
man the police was coming, yet he assured us he was okay, determined to let his tent dry after last
night’s rain. As four officers descend from the van, the two women beside me quickly send out
Facebook messages to other citizens marauding the park. In a few minutes time, around twenty
people, most of them women, have gathered in a crescent at the foot of the hill. Without uttering a
word, they take out their phones and turn on their cameras.
“Can you please stop filming?” one of the officers asks.
“We have every right to do so”, a woman replies.
We see how the officers and the man on the hill exchange a few words. We are standing too far
to hear what they are saying. The man reaches for his pocket, opens his wallet and shows them a
* Ghent University, Belgium
The peer review history for this article is available at https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/imig.12715
doi: 10.1111/imig.12715
© 2020 The Author
International Migration © 2020 IOM
International Migration
ISSN 0020-7985Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
document. He slowly starts packing up his tent and walks away. The officers carry on by foot,
patrolling the park. And so do we.
Throughout 2017 and 2018, unlikely face-offs such as these grew increasingly frequent in and
around the Parc Maximilien. Around 1000 migrants had “stranded” in Brussels while trying to
reach the UK (cf. Collyer, 2010). As politicians across the ideological spectrum feared the emer-
gence of a “jungle” similar to the one in Calais, they argued that either these so-called “transit
migrants” should be forced to apply for asylum in Belgium, or they be repatriated to their country
of origin or a safe third country.1 Citizens and NGOs were asked not to provide food, shelter or
other kinds of support,2 while the police increasingly organized raids to arrest, detain and deport
migrants who refused to comply. A range of state actors thus tried to “police” migrants into the
European refugee regime: those who disobeyed the rules were discouraged from staying through a
“politics of exhaustion” (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016; Welander, 2019) that subjected
them to “slow”, “structural” forms of violence (Davies et al, 2017).
In the meantime, migrants and citizens resisted this logic of policing by dissociating themselves
from the roles they were assigned. Migrants continued to move back and forth between European
countries, often relying on mutual networks of support and solidarity. In this article, however, I
focus on the efforts of a group of citizens affiliated to the Brussels-based Citizen Platform for the
Support of Refugees [Plateforme Citoyenne de Soutien aux Refugies], which has continued to sup-
port migrants irrespective of their legal status. The Citizen Platform emerged in 2015, in response
to the increased arrival of asylum seekers and refugees, and subsequently developed into a volun-
teer-driven service provider. In 2017, the Platform underwent a dramatic makeover as it intensified
its support to migrants who were stranded in Brussels, precisely at a time when they were being
pursued by the Belgian police. By offering shelter, food and clothes, as well as enabling access to
medical care, social networks and legal information, the Platform and its members engaged in a
particularly “subversive” form of humanitarian action (Vandevoordt, 2019b).
In this article, then, I try to accomplish two aims: first, I seek to demonstrate how Belgian state
actors have consciously produced a humanitarian crisis as part of a broader “politics of exhaustion”
that seeks to force “illegalized migrants”3 into the European refugee regime; and second, I describe
the specific forms of humanitarian action emerging from citizens’ response to these policies. As I
have argued elsewhere (Vandevoordt, 2019b), these actions can be characterized as a “thick”, “par-
ticularist” form of solidarity in which civil initiatives gradually expand their range of actions to
include social, legal and political support, and through which they gradually become more con-
scious of their subversive effects. More precisely, this article describes how these opposing logics
conjure in three political “moments” (Johnson, 2012) or “scenes” (Depraetere and Oosterlynck,
2017) in which the Platform and its members have opposed the state’s attempts to police migrants
into the European refugee regime.
This article thus makes two contributions to the critical literatures on (European) migration poli-
cies and grassroots solidarity. On the one hand, I draw on the notions of “bare life”, “necropolitics”
and a “politics of exhaustion” to show the effects of the European refugee regime in the specific
case of Brussels, which has remained relatively underexplored, compared with places such as
Calais (e.g. Alcalde and Portes, 2018; Vertongen, 2018; Knops and Evers, 2019; Vandevoordt,
2019a, 2019b). I describe how, between August 2017 and December 2018, Belgian state actors
have tried to hunt down illegalized migrants, and therefore created a humanitarian borderland that
bears similarities to those in Calais, Moria and other places across Europe (Walters 2011; Pallister-
Wilkins, 2018; Ansems de Vries and Guild, 2019).
On the other hand, I connect this critical literature with studies on grassroots solidarity. I show
how, in and around Brussels, this “politics of exhaustion” has elicited specific forms of resistance
from collectives like the Citizen Platform. This strengthens the claim made by others that the
actions of migrant, state and civil actors constantly shape and subvert each other (cf. Fleischmann,
2017; Zamponi, 2018; Vandevoordt, 2019a, 2019b). More precisely, I argue that what were initially
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rather straightforward acts of minimalist material support to suffering subjects, gradually developed
into a more maximalist solidarity with a particular group of migrants, partly due to increasingly
repressive border policies.
METHODS
To substantiate these claims, I draw on ethnographic work with the Plateforme Citoyenne de Sou-
tien aux Refugies (henceforth Citizen Platform), which I have conducted between January 2017
and March 2019. This has included participating as a volunteer in the different services the Plat-
form offers to migrants (e.g. the humanitarian hub it runs together with Medecins sans Frontieres
and Medecins du Monde), as well as in its social events and social media groups, and it has
included in-depth interviews with coordinators and volunteers. While my focus is on the Citizen
Platform and its diverse pool of members, I also draw on informal conversations with migrants,
and on more extensive research with other civil initiatives in Belgium (e.g. Vandevoordt, 2019a).
In this article, I zoom in on a few controversial “moments” or “scenes” in which the Citizen Plat-
form has resisted what some of its coordinators described as a “hunt” for illegalized migrants, com-
manded by the Federal government. To that purpose, I have extended my field notes and interview
transcripts with state documents and media reports. These include investigative reports of police
violence and the Federal government’s policy notes and press releases. And it includes politicians’
statements on these controversial moments or scenes, as recorded by media reports. This should
allow me to shed a light on the rationale behind the actions taken by state actors, or, at the very
least, how these actions are legitimized to the wider public.
FROM CONTEXT TO THEORY
Context
From August 2017 onwards, a constantly changing group of around 1000 migrants has lived on
the streets of Brussels. Their legal statuses and migration trajectories vary, with some having only
just arrived in Europe, while others have been travelling back and forth between countries for
months or even years. A similar variety applies to their national backgrounds, although most come
from unstable countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan.
Although they share the aim of reaching the UK, research reports indicate that the majority do not
arrive in Europe with the preconceived plan of ultimately reaching the UK Instead, the latter only
becomes their preferred destination after they have been confronted with destitution, legal insecurity
and violence in Europe (Davies et al, 2017; Jaspars and Buchanan-Smith, 2018; Doctors Without
Borders, 2018).
For a long time, migrants trying to reach the UK have lived in makeshift settlements in the
North-West of France. Throughout 2015 and 2016, their numbers rose, which resulted in the signif-
icant growth of the so-called “Jungle” of Calais, smaller settlements in and around Grande-Synthe
(Dunkirk) and, later on, in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in cities such as Paris. In March and
October 2016, however, the Jungle of Calais was destroyed by national French police forces. In
April 2017, a fire destroyed the nearby camp in Grande-Synthe, which had been erected by
Medecins Sans Frontieres, and which housed between 1,000 and 1,500 persons.4 Since then,
French police forces have tried to prevent new settlements by dismantling tents and confiscating
sleeping bags and backpacks – which has been usefully described by Travis Van Isacker (2019) as
acts of “domicide”. At the same time, concerns grew among Flemish politicians that a new
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“Jungle” would emerge just over the French–Belgian border. In response, they discouraged the Bel-
gian population from helping out migrants, and temporarily increased controls at car park and pet-
rol stations near the French border. As a result, more and more migrants trying to reach the UK
were pushed further out to Brussels and its hinterlands.
To understand why migrants have “stranded” in places such as Calais, Grande-Synthe and Brus-
sels, we need to take a closer look at how the European refugee regime functions. In Europe, asy-
lum seekers and refugees are entitled to legal protection under specific conditions. One of these
conditions is formulated by the Dublin regulations, which stipulate that migrants should apply for
asylum in their first (European) country of arrival (UNHCR, 2017). As soon as they can be linked
to a previous country through fingerprints, a recent legal stay or a previous asylum application,
migrants risk being sent back to that particular country, and denied the right to apply for asylum in
another European country.
Obviously, the Dublin regulations shift the responsibility to process asylum claims from North-
Western countries to those on its southern border. In general, however, the latter do not only have
a weaker economy with fewer employment opportunities, but also offer less support to asylum
seekers and refugees in terms of housing, health care and legal information. Earlier research with
migrants in Calais, for instance, found that many had initially applied for asylum in countries such
as Italy (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016; Davies et al, 2017; Welander, 2019). Some
migrants’ application for asylum was still running when they decided to leave, as they were con-
fronted with, among other things: procedures taking longer than a year; poor living conditions in
overpopulated accommodation centres or being forced out of these centres a few days after their
arrival, leaving them to live in informal settlements or squats; and violent encounters with extreme-
right militias or hard-handed border officers. A small group of people had even been granted refu-
gee status, but subsequently faced destitution as they could not find work or housing, and lacked
the legal information and financial means to initiate family reunification. As they found themselves
living on the streets, begging or scrounging trash bins, they decided to take the “gamble” (Belloni,
2016) and continue their journey North. Another group of migrants had their claims for asylum
rejected, but claimed to be unable to return for fear of persecution or violence. As a result of the
Dublin regulations, however, they could not apply for asylum anywhere else in Europe for at least
12 months. This puts them into a “legal limbo” where they are entitled neither to protection nor to
basic forms of support such as shelter, food or medical care (UNHCR, 2017). At the same time,
governments have increasingly put in place measures to deter migrants from unlawfully staying on
the national territory, by rendering their living conditions as difficult as possible. In this sense, the
European refugee regime produces not only “refugees” and “asylum seekers”, but also “illegalized”
migrants who are excluded from legal protection and basic forms of support.
Policing and politics
In and around the Parc Maximilien, two opposing logics conjure. On the one hand, the European
refugee regime stresses that either people should apply for asylum in the country designated by the
Dublin regulations, or, in case their application has been rejected, they should return to their coun-
try of origin or a safe third country.5 On the other hand, a variety of civil actors, which includes
migrant communities, civil initiatives and professional NGOs, continue to provide shelter, food,
clothes, medical care, legal information, access to phone credits, etc., to migrants, irrespective of
their legal status and previous trajectories.
These two logics can be elucidated by Jacques Ranciere’s (2010) distinction between “policing”
and “politics”, which has gained influence in critical studies of humanitarianism (Agier, 2011; Tick-
tin, 2011) and migrant solidarity (Millner, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Depraetere and Oosterlynck,
2017). Policing does not refer to “the police” as a specific institutional agent (i.e. what we
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commonly describe as “police forces”), but to a set of practices that allocates a specific position to
individuals or groups. When government representatives argue that migrants should either apply for
asylum or be deported, they are thus “policing” migrants into the European refugee regime. As
“asylum seekers”, their claims can be heard and their presence is justified. As “transit”, “undocu-
mented” or “illegal” migrants, they have no right to speak or be present.
Politics, similarly, should not be confused with institutional politics enacted by elected parties
through parliament, but consists of actions through which subjects dissociate themselves from the
positions allocated to them, and claim a right to take part. Illegalized migrants publicly claiming
their rights as labourers, for instance, engage in politics proper because they re-claim the right to
take part as labourers, rather than illegalized migrants. In this regard, Ranciere’s work resonates
with the burgeoning literatures on “acts of citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen, 2008) and “autonomous
migration” (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). These have shifted focus from legal citizenship status
and government policies, respectively, towards migrants who act as citizens by participating in pro-
tests or continuing to move across borders.
Ranciere’s notion of politics has also been used to understand the acts of solidarity through
which citizens support illegalized migrants. As Heather Johnson (2012) has noted, when citizens
support migrants irrespective of their legal status, they engage in a political action that shifts the
boundaries of who can take part in the social order. Politics then not only includes an institutional-
ized repertoire of actions such as elections, lobbying, manifestations or letter-writing campaigns,
but also encompasses minor, everyday acts of assistance. From these citizens’ perspective, migrants
who do not apply for asylum in Belgium are not in “transit”, “undocumented” or “illegal”, but con-
tinue to be “forced migrants”, “refugees” or simply “human beings” with a project of their own.
Bare life, necropolitics and the politics of exhaustion
Before turning to the moments in which these policing and politicizing logics conjure, I want to
zoom in on specific series of policing technologies in the context of European border enforcement.
When migrants are illegalized, they are not simply categorized as “others” who do not have a right-
ful place within the refugee regime. Rather, they are excluded in such a way that makes them vul-
nerable to a particular type of violence. To understand this process, I think it is useful to draw on
Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) notion of “bare life”, albeit in an adapted way that leaves room for
agency and context.
Agamben’s initial endeavour was to understand the legal–political structures that allowed the
Nazi extermination camps to emerge. In his view, one of the key preconditions was that Jews,
Gypsies and other parts of the European population were first excluded from the legal and political
space of the nation state – hence, Jewish Germans were denationalized before they entered the
camps. Once they had been robbed of their rights as national subjects, their legal–political position
resembled that of an obscure figure of ancient Roman law, the Homo sacer: his was a life that
could be killed but not sacrificed. In that sense, the extermination camps produced instances of
“bare life” that were stripped of their membership to the legal–political order. In places where bare
life is produced, “the normal order is de facto suspended” and “whether or not atrocities are com-
mitted depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police” (Agamben, 1998:
174).
Agamben’s work has received staunch criticism, mostly for his sweeping claims that camps can
be thought of as the matrix of modern politics, and the figure of the refugee as emblematic for the
bare life produced by the sovereign state (Genel, 2006; Rygiel, 2011; Rigby and Schlembach,
2013). In this article, however, I want to take a different reading of Agamben’s work, by conceiv-
ing of “bare life” as a subject category that is produced by a series of power technologies imposed
upon groups of people in specific spatial and historical contexts. More precisely, I argue that by
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placing people outside the refugee regime in a particular way, they are rendered vulnerable to struc-
tural violence for which those inflicting it are unlikely to be sanctioned. This process is consciously
used as a power technique to force migrants into compliance with the refugee regime. In other
words, by reading “bare life” as a situated power technique, we can undo Agamben’s ontologizing
claims on the camp and the refugee. Instead, we can focus on how states attempt to produce “bare
life” in specific contexts – as they produce “deportability” and “illegality” (De Genova, 2002) –
which leaves room, as any power technique does, for resistance, agency and re-subjectification.
Conceiving the production of “bare life” as a power technology deployed in a particular histori-
cal and spatial context brings us closer to recent scholars who have drawn on Achille Mbembe’s
(2003) notion of “necropolitics”. Similar to Agamben, Mbembe (2003: 11) assumes that sover-
eignty ultimately resides “in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must
die”. Implicitly, however, Mbembe extends his conception of sovereignty beyond immediate deci-
sions of life and death, to include the willed creation of “death-worlds” where suffering is inflicted
upon subjects without necessarily killing them. Drawing on the examples of colonized Algerian
towns and occupied Palestinian territories, Mbembe (2003: 40) describes these death-worlds as
“new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subject to conditions of
life conferring upon them the status of living dead”.
Davies et al (2017) have usefully applied the notion of necropolitics to migrants living in make-
shift camps in Calais. They describe how its residents have been gradually forced onto a small
patch of de-industrialized land, where they were abandoned by the French state and most profes-
sional NGOs. Davies et al (2017) documented the physical health threats the Jungle’s residents
faced in Calais through chronic exposure to harsh weather conditions and a lack of drinking water,
food, sanitation and medicine. Its residents lived “a form of ‘death-in-life’ which emerges from
deliberately produced abject conditions” (Davies et al, 2017: 1268). They were “not actively killed”
but “destined to suffer [the] harm and indignity of long-term cruel conditions” (Davies et al, 2017:
1280). Hence, they conclude that in Calais, suffering became “a political technology”, which keeps
migrants “alive but in a state of injury” (Davies et al, 2017: 1280; second quote from Mbembe,
2003: 21).
This process of producing “bare life” through the creation of “death-worlds” can be explicated
further through Leonie Ansems de Vries and Martha Welander’s (2016; Ansems de Vries and
Guild, 2019; Welander, 2019) notion of a “politics of exhaustion” – but see Freedman (2018) and
Van Isacker (2019) for useful, alternative conceptualizations. Drawing on ethnographic work in
Calais, Ansems de Vries and Welander (2016) note that many migrants “spoke in terms of ‘being
so tired’ and of having been ‘completely exhausted’ by repeated evictions, detention, push-backs,
deportations, untreated health problems, below-standard living conditions, the continuous threat and
reality of violence, as well as by continued uncertainty both of daily life and of their future pro-
spects in Europe”. In places such as Calais, “exhaustion” has thus become a strategy in the produc-
tion of “death-worlds”. In a recent blog post, Welander (2019) lists a series of concrete practices
through which the French state has practised this politics: “dispersals and push-backs, arbitrary
detention and removals, evictions and demolitions, the blocking of humanitarian aid, sanitation and
medical care, and the overall criminalisation of solidarity”. The result, she concludes, “can be
understood as a complex deterrence approach with the objective of exhausting asylum seekers,
mentally and physically, with the ultimate aim of deterring them from approaching Britain for asy-
lum, or indeed other European asylum system”.
In such a site of consciously produced destitution, migrants are forced into a position of need for
basic forms of support – shelter, food, clothes and medicine – which almost exclusively comes
from migrant networks and/or civic initiatives. It is in this context that we need to understand the
political “moments” (Johnson, 2012) or “scenes” (Depraetere and Oosterlynck, 2017) in which the
logic of policing is opposed by simple acts of humanitarian support. In the remainder of this article,
I therefore describe the continuous interaction between such political and policing actions.
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POLICING AND POLITICS IN BRUSSELS
Resisting raids
In August 2017, the Federal Belgian government began to organize systematic police raids in two
locations where migrants and smugglers gathered: the area around the Brussels-North train station,
which encompasses the Parc Maximilien, and public parking lots adjacent to highways where
migrants tried to get aboard of lorries. According to Minister of Security and Domestic Affairs, Jan
Jambon, the aim was threefold: to dismantle smuggling networks; deport so-called “transit-mi-
grants” – those trying to reach the UK rather than apply for asylum in Belgium; and discourage
those who could not be deported from staying in Belgium without residence documents.6
In practice, however, these raids only took place once every few weeks, and usually no more
than 20 or 30 arrests were made. The Immigration Office faced several challenges in effectively
deporting the migrants who had been arrested by the Federal police. The most pertinent challenge
to deportation was that if migrants’ fingerprints had not been taken in a different European country,
they were often difficult to deport, either because their countries of origin were not known or
because they refused to readmit them – a problem European governments have long been facing in
enforcing deportation (Gibney, 2008; Ellermann, 2010). As a result, most arrestees were released
after a few days, thus creating a cat-and-mouse game in which police officers hunted down and
captured migrants, only to release them back into the streets.7 Like many European governments,
State Secretary of Asylum and Migration, Theo Francken tried to address this problem by establish-
ing bilateral agreements with countries of origin, making sure that they confirm migrants’ national
identity and/or provide the necessary visa to facilitate deportation. In September 2017, however,
Francken went one step further by inviting a delegation of 3 government officials of the Sudanese
National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) to help identify its citizens among those
arrested.8 Opinion makers, NGOs and politicians expressed their concerns on the safety of those
deported, given the Sudanese government’s record of human rights violations.9 The identification
mission nonetheless continued and facilitated the return of 10 persons who had been arrested the
weeks before (CGVS, 2018).
In December 2017, the Tahrir Institute for Middle-Eastern Policy communicated that it had gath-
ered testimonies of deportees who had been subjected to intimidation, abuse and torture upon their
return. In response, an independent investigation was launched by the Commissariat-General for
Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGVS, 2018). The report criticized the inadequate test of the non-
refoulement principle and some practical aspects of the procedures (such as the absence of an
Immigration Office translator when the interviews by Sudanese officials were taking place), yet
claimed not to have found solid evidence of abuse and torture after return. In contrast, the Commis-
sariat-General’s report expressed doubts on what it described as the three most important witnesses
mentioned in the Tahrir Institute’s report, due to factual inconsistencies. While the Tahrir Institute
welcomed the report’s criticisms on the procedure, it also claimed that some of the testimonies and
video images it had provided had been omitted from the investigation.10
Throughout this period, the Citizen Platform intensified its support to this group of migrants. Just
before the police raids began to take place in the Parc Maximilien, the Platform’s leading volun-
teers had noticed the increasing presence of minors, women and persons with urgent medical needs
among those staying in the park. As they struggled to find a place for everyone in need within
existing shelters, they turned to an emergency measure they had used before: when Winter hit in
December 2015 and a large group of migrants were awaiting the registration of their asylum appli-
cations, citizens had opened their homes to migrants. In August 2017, a small group of no more
than fifteen leading volunteers once again hosted migrants themselves. Hence, the Citizen Platform
engaged in a political action, not so much by organizing traditional forms of political action, but
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by intensifying their support to migrants, precisely at a time when they were being pursued by Bel-
gian state actors.
In the first days of September 2017, the Platform’s actions were spurred on by a tweet posted by
State Secretary Francken. After a new raid in the Parc Maximilien, Francken proudly boasted of its
results:
This morning 14 people arrested in the Parc Maximilien and 9 people in the Brussels-North station.
3 declare to be minors.
According to the police scarcely people in the park.
#CleaningUp.
The suggestion that people could be “cleaned up” evoked indignant reactions from politicians,
NGOs and citizens. In the following weeks, the Platform’s appeals to help provide shelter for the
most vulnerable people in the park generated such an overwhelming response that enabled it to
offer a bed to all migrants stranded in the park, not only the most vulnerable ones. By the middle
of October, the number of people willing to host migrants into their homes had risen from fifteen
to more than three hundred.
Well aware that this system of hebergement would never amount to a structural solution, the
Platform’s coordinators lobbied the Brussels’ Regional government and some of its 19 municipali-
ties to open up a collective shelter for this group of migrants. Their efforts were largely successful:
due to the resistance by Federal government, the Region of Brussels decided not to open such a
centre itself, but to provide temporary financial support to the Citizen Platform to do it in their
place. In December 2017, the Platform established the so-called “Porte d’Ulysse” in an empty wing
of an office building on the outskirts of the capital. When it opened, the Porte d’Ulysse offered a
bed for the night, shower facilities and warm meals to 80 persons. In the following months, due to
increasing material and financial support the Platform was able to gradually expand its capacity to
350 beds per night (Vandevoordt, 2019a).
Besides organizing shelter, the Citizen Platform responded to police raids in two ways: by orga-
nizing counter-marauds and by enhancing migrants’ access to legal information and support. First,
as the Federal government increased the number of police raids on migrants, the Platform organized
counter-marauds such as the one I described at the beginning of this article. These began on 23
January 2018 during a rather spectacular event that caught the media’s attention and temporarily
set the agenda for a few weeks. The Citizen Platform had received an anonymous tip that a large-
scale police action was going to take place in the Parc Maximilien. The Platform immediately
launched several calls on its closed Facebook groups for volunteers and militants to help their
“friends” during the action. By the time the police arrived, all migrants had been evacuated. In their
place, more than 3,000 citizens formed a human chain around the Park. In the months to come, the
same course of events repeated itself, although with less citizens and public visibility. Each time
the Platform received tips on a pending police raid, it continued to mobilize up to 30 volunteers to
warn the migrants stranded in public places (Vandevoordt, 2019b).
Second, the Citizen Platform tried to ensure migrants had access to legal information and sup-
port. In the Humanitarian Hub (near the Parc Maximilien) and the Social Centre, volunteers who
had been trained as social workers offered free social–administrative information on asylum proce-
dures in Belgium. Legal advisers employed by professional NGOs such as Cire and Vluchtelingen-
werk Vlaanderen also held regular consultations in both the Hub and the Social Centre. In addition,
the Platform developed a registration system through which migrants could gain access to the Porte
d’Ulysse and which required them to engage in an extensive conversation with one of the
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Platform’s social–administrative workers, who informed them on their rights, how the asylum pro-
cedure works, their relative chances to be granted asylum in Belgium, the precise implications of
Dublin regulations and, in case of unaccompanied minors, their rights to residence irrespective of
their asylum procedure. The emphasis, to be sure, was on providing information, not on persuading
migrants into taking any particular decision.
Both the counter-marauds and the legal informing are indicative for the types of support civil ini-
tiatives such as the Citizen Platform provide, and how they do so. Rather than limiting themselves
to minimal (e.g. medical, nutritional or shelter-centred) humanitarian aid, such initiatives gradually
extend their actions to include socio-administrative counselling and more “disobedient”, symboli-
cally contentious acts of solidarity. This is characteristic, I have argued elsewhere, for the “particu-
larist” form of solidarity that is embodied by some civil initiatives supporting migrants: instead of
strictly applying the principle of neutrality (not taking sides), they stand in solidarity with those
who are, in their view, “wronged” the most (Vandevoordt, 2019b). Whereas most volunteers, in
these settings, initially start by offering minimal material support to all those in need (e.g. food,
shelter and clothes), they gradually focus on one particular group – in this case, “stranded”
migrants trying to reach the UK – and broaden the types of support they provide to include social
networks, legal information and political protest. In most cases, moreover, this gradual politiciza-
tion is at least partly a response to increasingly repressive border policies (Zamponi, 2018; Fleis-
chmann, 2019; Vandevoordt, 2019a).
Resisting violence
Apart from deporting illegalized migrants, the police raids also aimed to discourage them from
staying in Belgium without applying for asylum. Belgian police forces resorted to practices similar
to those of their colleagues in the North of France (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016; Van
Isacker, 2019; Welander, 2019): backpacks, tents and mobile phones were confiscated, while
migrants that were sleeping in the park were harshly wakened by police officers and dogs. Any
attempt to set up a more permanent settlement was immediately dismantled.
These actions closely resemble what Ansems de Vriese and Welander (2016) have described as a
politics of exhaustion, which generates an environment in which rough or harsh treatments become
functional to the aims of policymakers. Among the Platform’s volunteers, stories of police violence
circulated frequently. One of the Platform’s coordinators, for instance, told me that last “winter
we’ve seen that people’s shoes are taken away from them in the middle of the street, and their
backpacks are thrown into the garbage can by the police”. According to him, this was directly
related to the intensified police raids and politicians’ accompanying discourses. When the raids
intensified in December 2017, more and more stories of violence began to emerge.
One of the Platform’s hosts, a retired nurse in her sixties, told me of similar stories.
You don’t expect these things. . . I know that in the prison of X, they have to sleep naked in their
cells. There’s no beds, just concrete, and then the police pours water over the concrete so that it’s
freezing cold and they can’t lie down. It’s nice, isn’t it? Those people are Nazis. And when [mi-
grants] ask for water, they are told to go over there, to the toilet. It’s incredible.
Stories such as these travelled frequently across the Platform’s networks, and they help us under-
stand why, in the anecdote I described at the beginning of this chapter, citizens immediately began
to film the events in the Parc Maximilien. Some volunteers began to collect these testimonies and
encouraged migrants to file formal complaints. Yet doing so proved difficult, one of the coordina-
tors told me. “We need to know which police officer it was, what’s his name, which police station
it was. But these are things that most of the guys don’t know. I have experienced it several times,
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if you ask a police officer for his name. . . Because they know that if they give you their name, we
can press charges”.
In the summer and autumn of 2018, three separate reports by NGOs and academics documented
migrants’ accounts of police violence, and corroborated much of the stories circulating among the
Platform’s volunteers (Doctors of the World, 2018; Jaspars and Buchanan-Smith, 2018; Refugee
rights Europe, 2018). According to Doctors of the World (2018), 25 per cent out of the migrants
they contacted had experienced some sort of violence by the Belgian police. These persons were
invited to a semi-structured interview for detailing the nature of police violence. Of those participat-
ing, 41 per cent claimed that possessions such as mobile phones, train tickets and money were con-
fiscated and not returned after their release. Similarly, 41 per cent declared to have received no
water or food for more than 15 hours, while 13 per cent said they had been denied access to sanita-
tion. Nearly 60 per cent of respondents claimed to have been hit by police officers with their hands,
feet or batons. About 64 per cent of arrested respondents were forced to being body-searched nak-
edly, which in most cases went accompanied by humiliating behaviour.
Four months later, a counter-report was published by the Standing Police Monitoring Committee
– the independent government agency responsible for examining complaints against the police,
commonly referred to as the “Committee P”. Their report drew on long-term observations in all
phases of police work, and on interviews with both police officers and detained migrants. Accord-
ing to the report, the Federal police had treated migrants “correctly and humanely” although it
argued that this was a result of the willingness and good intentions of the police officers involved,
as the police actions lacked routine procedures, expertise and knowledge.
The extent and the nature of police violence has thus remained disputed. While it seems unlikely
that physical violence has become a formalized part of police procedures, there are clear indications
that a grey zone has emerged that thrives on a threat of “slow” or “structural violence” (Davies
et al, 2017) that remains, in practice, without sanction. This grey zone is a product of the legal–po-
litical position in which migrants are forced: they lack the information required to file complaints
while doing so would increase the risk of deportation. In this position, verbal and physical violence
inflicted upon them is difficult to prove and unlikely to be sanctioned. This produces “bare life”
not in the sense of an ontological state of being in which migrants have no agency whatsoever, but
in the sense that migrants are exposed to the threat of violence without consequences for those
inflicting it. In this particular context – and as the Committee P suggests – just how far the politics
of exhaustion goes seems to depend on the “civility and ethical sense” of individual police officers
(Agamben, 1998: 174).
The Citizen Platform’s members responded in two ways, both of which involves close collabora-
tions with specialized legal NGOs. First, as some of the Platform’s hosts began to collect and
spread these testimonies of police violence, the Platform’s coordinators pressured allied NGOs such
as Doctors of the World, Humain and Myria, to conduct a systematical, independent research that
documented these accounts. In this sense, they played a crucial role in “speaking out” and “bearing
witness” (Vandevoordt, 2019b).
Second, the Platform’s hosts tried to address migrants’ lack of access to legal counselling in
detention. Migrants’ mobile phones were usually confiscated upon their detention, which meant that
they lost contact with persons of trust and specialized barristers. This rendered them dependent on
the pro deo lawyers provided by the police, often a few days later. In response, some hosts insisted
their guests kept a piece of paper with them at all times, containing their hosts’ contact details.
Others asked their guests to learn their phone numbers by heart. Once they would be detained, they
could therefore contact their hosts who then reached out to legal NGOs specialized in migrant
detention, such as Progress Lawyers and Getting the Voice Out.
Again, these two responses show how the initially straightforward humanitarian act of offering a
bed for the night subsequently fed into targeted, more consciously political actions to undo the
policing techniques deployed by the state. As illegalized migrants were subjected to threats of
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violence with dim chances of inflicting it being sanctioned, the Platform’s members undertook
actions to include these migrants in the legal–political order. In that sense, these citizens tried to
resist the production of bare life.
Resisting social death
In January 2018, an Ethiopian man was hit by a car, as he ran away from a police raid on a park-
ing lot next to the E40 highway. In a TV interview, Minister Jambon described the man’s death as
“an unfortunate incident”. But, he added, “the police has just done its job. They are not to blame”.
Jambon went on to stress that this police action had been planned for a long time, and was not part
of the additional patrols organized to arrest migrants. “But it doesn’t really matter”, he said. “You
can never prevent people from doing dangerous things. Everybody knows that crossing a highway
is not allowed and even dangerous”.11
While Jambon implicitly blamed the Ethiopian man for taking too much risks, Mehdi Kassou,
the Citizen Platform’s spokesperson, suggested that his death was an indirect consequence of the
raids commanded by Minister Jambon.
I think this is just the beginning. Now that Mr. Jambon has decided to increase the presence of
police forces on highways, it’s evident that migrants will flee. The highway is dangerous, every-
body knows that. A little more than two months ago we already had to identify the corpse of a 15-
year-old young man, who we found dead in the bushes [in the Parc Maximilien]. Now we will see
police officers, and security officers who may be even less efficient than the police, who run after
them on the highway. This is a real drama, a human drama.12
A few months later, another death caused much more controversy. In the early hours of 17 May
2018, Mawda Shawri, a Kurdish-Syrian toddler, died aboard a white van that was being chased by
the police near the city of Mons. The van contained 11 illegalized migrants and was assumed to be
driven by a smuggler. As the precise circumstances of Mawda’s death remained unclear, civil and
state actors disputed who was to blame. Initially, the Public Prosecutor declared that Mawda had
died of a skull fracture due to the abrupt stopping of the van. One day later, the Public Prosecutor
changed its version of the facts, now stating that Mawda had died from a bullet fired by the police,
aiming for the tires. On the 20 May, three days after the events, Mawda’s parents gave a press con-
ference, accompanied by their lawyer. They claimed that Mawda had been shot by an officer aim-
ing for the driver, who sat next to the toddler and her parents. After they stopped and got out of
the vehicle, the parents cried for an ambulance, but were instead separated from their daughter.
They were only informed of her death one day and a half later, in prison, when the news had
already spread across the media. As they claimed to have lost all faith in the still ongoing investi-
gation of the Standing Police Committee, they demanded a separate parliamentary investigation to
establish the true course of events.13
On the 24 May, Bart De Wever, the leader of the N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Flanders’ lar-
gest political party), made a statement that reinforced those of his party members Minister Jambon
and State Secretary Francken:
There’s a whole previous history to this story. The family applied for asylum in Germany. They
have then gone unlawfully to England, where they have been expelled and returned to Germany.
Last year their asylum application has been turned down, and since then they have been arrested
three times in our country as they were trying to go back to England. One time they have even
been stopped with their children in a refrigerator truck. However tragic the death of a child may
be, we also need to take into account the responsibility of the parents. Only talking about these
people as victims does not seem correct to me.14
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Like Minister Jambon, De Wever characterized Mawda’s death as a tragic incident for which not
the police, but her parents, carried the largest part of the blame. More precisely, it was because
they had refused to accept their role within the refugee regime, that is of either applying for asylum
in their first country of arrival, or of returning to a third safe country, that had led to the toddler’s
death. In this logic, migrants are allocated a wry form of agency, limited by the parameters defined
by the refugee regime. And as soon as they cross these parameters, they are reduced, in the view
of De Wever, to instances of “bare life” with little entitlements to state protection. In this sense,
the threat of death is used as a political technology (Davies et al, 2017) to force people into com-
pliance.
In response, the Citizen Platform mobilized citizens to symbolically include Mawda and her fam-
ily in local social life – through what Maurice Stierl (2016) has usefully described as “grief acti-
vism”. In the weeks after her death, Mawda’s parents stayed at the Porte d’Ulysse and in the
homes of some of the Platform’s hosts, from where they received legal support from specialized
NGOs. On 30 May, the day of the funeral, the Platform organized a silent wake in which 1,500
people, dressed in white, accompanied Mawda’s parents and her brother, dressed in black. The
wake took the Porte d’Ulysse as its point of departure, and was repeated in smaller towns across
the country, where groups of people gathered to mourn in silence. Over the next few months, the
Platform’s coordinators regularly posted pictures and stories on its closed Facebook groups, to
report on Mawda’s parents’ well-being and their quest for justice. In the meantime, the Platform
and its members continued to provide everyday social support, and helped to organize debates on
the causes of Mawda’s death and the politicians they held responsible. In their view, Mawda per-
sonified the “bare life” the state attempted to produce. Through its actions and its discourse, the
Platform tried to counter these power techniques by portraying Mawda and her family as innocent
victims who had paid the price of a ruthless politics of exhaustion, and by including her, socially
and legally, into local life.
CONCLUSIONS
This article described three moments in which the logics of policing and politics conjured, in the
specific context of citizens offering humanitarian support to illegalized migrants in and around
Brussels. In this concluding section, I relate these logics to two broader issues: first, how European
policies have produced humanitarian borderland in the heart of the continent; and second, how this
has elicited aspecific type of humanitarian support from civil initiatives.
On the one hand, migration policies have tried to police illegalized migrants into the European
refugee regime. Federal Belgian actors gave migrants two options: either they applied for asylum
in their first country of arrival, or they were to be deported. If they remained on the national terri-
tory without residence documents – even if in an attempt to reach a different country – they were
subjected to a particular type of violence, which I have tried to elucidate using three critical, over-
lapping concepts: first, the Belgian state attempted to reduce migrants to instances of “bare life”,
thus creating a legal–political grey zone in which those excluded from the national order can be
harmed or even killed without consequence (Agamben, 1998); second, as in Calais, Belgian state
actors created “death-worlds” in places such as the Parc Maximilien, the Brussels-North train sta-
tion or public parking lots, where suffering was used as a power technology to induce compliance
(Mbembe, 2003; Davies et al, 2017); and third, the “politics of exhaustion” comprised a series of
on-the-ground strategies through which any form of temporary settlement or a fulfilment of basic
needs was made well-nigh impossible (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016; Welander, 2019). To
be sure, these three concepts emerged from specific historical and spatial contexts: “bare life”
results from an analysis of the Nazi extermination camps, “death-worlds” refers to colonial policies
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in Algeria and Palestine, and the “politics of exhaustion” denotes a more specific set of deterrence
strategies in the North of France. Together, however, they point to a series of distinct power tech-
niques that are similar in their ultimate effect: the creation of a humanitarian crisis, which polices
illegalized migrants into the European refugee regime.15
On the other hand, I argued that the humanitarian support civil initiatives provided can be con-
ceived of as a political action in which citizens stand in solidarity with illegalized migrants – even
though they themselves may portray their actions as apolitical or purely humanitarian (cf. Fleis-
chmann, 2017; Fleischmann and Steinhilper, 2017; Sinatti, 2019). It is only within this specific
context of a politics of exhaustion that simple humanitarian acts become political, as they seek to
include those who are excluded from the national order (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019). As
the case of the Citizen Platform demonstrates,16 however, under such circumstances civil initiatives
are unlikely to limit their actions to mere humanitarian support, precisely because migrants’ suffer-
ing is partly produced by their own nation state. In response, the Platform and its members
expanded its range of action to include social, legal and political support to those that were pursued
by the state – illegalized migrants trying to reach the UK. This expansion embodies, as I describe
in more detail elsewhere (Vandevoordt, 2019b), a more “particularist” form of solidarity that con-
trasts with the minimal, “universalist” reasoning with which humanitarian action is commonly asso-
ciated. Rather than refraining from taking sides (the principle of neutrality) in order to ensure
access to state-controlled areas of suffering, these citizens choose to stand with those who they feel
are wronged the most. While most volunteers initially start by offering straightforward material aid
such as shelter, the increasingly harsh state actions they encounter propel them into more subver-
sive forms of humanitarian action.
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NOTES
1. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160223_02144670.
https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/landuyt-als-wij-nu-plooien-komen-nog-veel-meer-illegalen-naar-hier~b
575c352/
https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2017/09/30/theo-francken---geen-tweede-calais-in-onze-hoofdstad-/
2. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2016/02/02/_je_kan_vluchtelingennietaanhunlotoverlaten-1-2562241/
3. I use the term “illegalized” rather than undocumented or irregular migrants to indicate that illegality is pro-
duced by a series of laws, policies and practices (cf. Bauder 2014)
4. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/11/blaze-devastates-grand-synthe-migrant-camp-outside-dun
kirk
5. These politics share similarities to “auto-expulsion” policies described by Eric Fassin and others in the
context of France’s policies towards Roma, and US policies towards illegalized migrants. This entails shut-
ting down access to basic social institutions (e.g. education, work and housing) in the hope that in France
to leave the territory of their own accord (Fassin et al 2014).
6. De Tijd 8.8.18. “De Migratiecrisis flakkert op.”
https://www.tijd.be/politiek-economie/belgie/algemeen/migratiecrisis-flakkert-op/10038028.html?fbclid=
IwAR36rcniyuJc9pA4KrNRmISW2pZOdGcXV-2eHc7tXoyWhn03lRHV8bfx1S8.
7. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20170907_03059682.
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8. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20170907_03059826.
9. https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/francken-soedanese-indentificatie-ambtenaren-zijn-geen-geheime-agente
n~ba829c65/
https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/sudanese-geheime-politie-identificeert-migranten-uit-maximiliaanpark~baa
928bd/
10. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2018/02/09/koert-debeuf---mensenrechtenorganisaties-zeggen-dat-die-getuigen/
11. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2018/01/30/jambon-over-ongeval-met-transmigrant---spijtig-voorval--maar-pol/
12. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2018/01/30/jambon-over-ongeval-met-transmigrant---spijtig-voorval--maar-pol/
13. https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/ouders-doodgeschoten-meisje-mawda-spreken-parket-tegen~b3e7a4dd/
14. https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2018/05/24/bart-de-wever-mawda/
15. In its most significant “moments”, this “politics of exhaustion” takes the form of a hunt for illegalized
migrants as instances of bare life. This is the case in the three moments I described above: the raids
through which police officers try to detain or discourage migrants from settling; the threat of physical vio-
lence deployed by the police, and, most dramatically, the toddler who was shot during a chase by the
police. Drawing on this, I think the term “hunt” can serve as a provocative metaphor that hints at the pro-
duction of bare life as “hunt” is usually used to describe the pursued animals with the aim of killing them.
16. Elsewhere, I have analyzed how the social and political context of Brussels has shaped the Citizen Plat-
form and its actions (Vandevoordt 2019a).
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